Landmark Judgements and Their Impact — UPSC Polity

Shankari Prasad, Golak Nath & the Road to Kesavananda Bharati

🎯 Exam priority: Important. This is one of the single most-tested chapters in the whole syllabus. Master the basic-structure lineage (Shankari Prasad → Golak Nath → Kesavananda Bharati → Minerva Mills) and the Article 21 lineage (Gopalan → Maneka Gandhi → Puttaswamy) above everything else; the remaining cases mostly reward knowing the case name, year, one-line holding and the amendment or Act it triggered.

Nine chapters of provisions and institutions come alive only when courts interpret them — and no set of interpretations has shaped the Constitution's actual working more than these.

Shankari Prasad, Golak Nath & the Road to Kesavananda Bharati

• Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951) — Articles 13 & 368 — held that Parliament's amending power under Article 368 extends even to Fundamental Rights, and that a constitutional amendment isn't "law" within Article 13(2) — so it cannot be void merely for abridging a Fundamental Right. It upheld the 1st Amendment Act (1951), which had curtailed the right to property by inserting Articles 31A and 31B. This view held the field for a decade and a half, reaffirmed in the Sajjan Singh case (1964).

• I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967) — Articles 13 & 368 — overruled both Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh. It held Article 368's power cannot be used to abridge or take away Fundamental Rights, and that a constitutional amendment is "law" under Article 13(2) — but, applying the doctrine of "prospective overruling," let the 1st, 4th and 17th Amendments already made stay valid. Impact: the 24th Amendment Act (1971) was enacted specifically to override this — restoring Parliament's power to amend any part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, and declaring that a constitutional amendment is not "law" under Article 13(2).

• Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) — the "Fundamental Rights case" — Articles 13 & 368 — overruled Golak Nath. It held Parliament can amend any or all provisions, including Fundamental Rights, under its constituent power — except the Constitution's "basic structure." It upheld the 24th Amendment and parts of the 25th and 29th Amendments. Impact: this judgment birthed the basic structure doctrine — arguably Indian constitutional law's single most consequential doctrine — which the Court has since applied and expanded across many later cases.

The Basic Structure Doctrine — Defended, Diluted & Refined

The basic structure doctrine didn't survive unchallenged — Parliament tried, twice, to dilute it, and the Supreme Court twice pushed back.

The Doctrine Defended, Diluted & Refined

• Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) — the "Election case" — Article 329A — reaffirmed basic structure by striking down Article 329A(4) (inserted by the 39th Amendment, 1975), which had placed election disputes involving the Prime Minister and the Lok Sabha Speaker beyond the jurisdiction of every court. Impact: following this case and Kesavananda together, the 42nd Amendment Act (1976) inserted Clauses (4) and (5) into Article 368 — trying to declare that no amendment could ever be questioned in any court, and that Parliament's amending power was wholly unlimited, in a direct attempt to dilute the doctrine.

• Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) — Article 31C & 368 — invalidated exactly those two 42nd Amendment clauses, along with the 42nd Amendment's changes to Article 31C. It held that limited amending power, judicial review, and the harmony between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are themselves basic features. Impact: this nullified the 42nd Amendment's attempt to give Parliament unlimited, uncontrolled amending power.

• Waman Rao v. Union of India (1980) — Article 368 & the Ninth Schedule — held that Ninth Schedule additions made before 24 April 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda verdict) are valid, while those made after that date remain open to challenge if they damage the basic structure.

• I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) — the "Ninth Schedule case" — Article 31B & the Ninth Schedule — reaffirmed Waman Rao and laid down specific tests for judging whether a post-1973 Ninth Schedule insertion damages the basic structure, resolving whether Article 31B can still immunise laws from Fundamental Rights scrutiny after 1973.

Article 21 & Personal Liberty — From a Narrow Reading to Privacy

No single Article's judicial history reads more like a story than Article 21's — a right that began narrowly and, through one case in particular, opened into the Constitution's most expansive guarantee.

Article 21 & Personal Liberty — From a Narrow Reading to Privacy

• A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) — the "Preventive Detention case" — Articles 21 & 22 — took a narrow, "textualist" reading: 'personal liberty' meant only freedom from physical restraint; Article 21 protected only against executive action, not legislative action; and 'procedure established by law' was not the same as the American 'due process of law.' This view held the field for nearly three decades and reached its "logical end" in the A.D.M. Jabalpur case (1976).

• A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) — the "Habeas Corpus case" — Articles 21 & 359 — delivered during the Emergency: it held that once Article 21's enforcement is suspended by a Presidential Order under Article 359, a detenu has no locus standi even to move a habeas corpus petition — a seriously flawed judgment that failed to defend citizens' rights through 1975-77. Impact: the 44th Amendment Act (1978) fixed this permanently — Article 21's enforcement can never again be suspended by a Presidential Order, even during an Emergency; the judgment survives only as a cautionary academic footnote.

• Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) — the "Personal Liberty case" — Article 21 — overruled A.K. Gopalan. It held that Articles 14, 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive (the celebrated "golden triangle"); that 'personal liberty' is of the widest amplitude; and that 'procedure established by law' must be just, fair and reasonable, not arbitrary — importing the spirit of the American 'due process of law' into Indian jurisprudence. Impact: this single judgment opened the door to reading a long list of new rights into Article 21 — a catalogue this playlist's forthcoming article on judgements expanding Article 21 covers in full.

• Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) — Articles 19 & 21 — upheld the death penalty's constitutionality but confined its use to the "rarest of rare cases" doctrine, a standard that has shaped every capital-sentencing decision since.

• K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) — the "Right to privacy case" — Article 21 — declared privacy a fundamental right intrinsic to Article 21 and Part III, subject to a three-fold test of legality, need and proportionality; it overruled the older M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1962) view that privacy wasn't constitutionally protected at all. A follow-up 2018 judgment (popularly "Puttaswamy-II") upheld the Aadhaar Act's core validity while striking down a few provisions, leading to the Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019.

Freedom of Speech, Expression & Economic Liberty

Article 19's guarantees have been tested against everything from a banned 1950s journal to a 2020 cryptocurrency ban — proof of how durable, and how contested, free expression and economic liberty remain.

Freedom of Speech, Expression & Economic Liberty

• Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950) — the "Cross Roads case" — Article 19 — held that free speech includes free circulation, without which publication is worthless; struck down Madras's ban on the journal Cross Roads. Impact: the 1st Amendment (1951) added "public order" as a fresh Article 19(2) reasonable restriction — since the Court had refused to allow restriction on that ground precisely because it wasn't yet listed there.

• Naveen Jindal case (2004) — Article 19 — held that flying the national flag with dignity is itself a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)'s free-expression guarantee, though not for commercial use.

• Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) — Article 19 — struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (punishing "offensive" online messages) as unconstitutionally vague and over-broad, violating Article 19(1)(a) and not saved by Article 19(2).

• Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) — Article 19 — held that internet access enjoys Article 19(1)(a)/(g) protection; an indefinite internet shutdown is impermissible, and any suspension order must satisfy the proportionality test.

• Internet and Mobile Association of India v. RBI (2020) — Article 19 — struck down an RBI circular that barred banks from servicing virtual-currency businesses, as a disproportionate restriction on the Article 19(1)(g) freedom to trade.

Federalism, Emergency Powers & Institutional Checks

From territorial cession to ordinance abuse, this cluster of cases drew the boundaries of how far the Centre, the states and their institutions can stretch their own emergency and discretionary powers.

Federalism, Emergency Powers & Institutional Checks

• Berubari Union case (1960) — Article 3, 368 & the First Schedule — held that ceding Indian territory to a foreign state needs a full constitutional amendment under Article 368 (Article 3 covers only internal adjustments between existing states); also held, controversially, that the Preamble is not part of the Constitution. Impact: the 9th Amendment Act (1960) gave effect to transferring the Berubari Union to Pakistan under the 1958 Nehru-Noon Agreement.

• S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — Article 356 — upheld some 1992 impositions of President's Rule while striking down others (Nagaland 1988, Karnataka 1989, Meghalaya 1991) as unconstitutional. It held that Article 356 proclamations are judicially reviewable, that a government's majority must be tested only on the floor of the House, and that secularism is part of the basic structure. Impact: this judgment sharply curbed the Centre's arbitrary use of President's Rule against state governments.

• D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1986) — Article 213 — held that Bihar's practice of re-promulgating the same ordinance repeatedly for years (256 ordinances between 1967-81) was a "fraud on the Constitution" and a "subversion of the democratic process," since the ordinance power cannot substitute for the legislature's own law-making role.

• Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — the "Defection case" — Article 368 & the Tenth Schedule (already covered in full in this playlist's Anti-Defection article) — struck down only paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule, the clause ousting judicial review, as unratified under Article 368(2); it upheld the rest of the Schedule.

Reservation & Social Justice

Reservation policy has generated some of the Constitution's most consequential — and most amended — case law, running in a direct line from a 1951 Madras order to a 2006 confirmation of promotion-quota amendments.

Reservation & Social Justice

• State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) — Articles 15, 29 & 46 — struck down Madras's caste-based "Communal GO," which had reserved medical/engineering college seats by community, holding that Directive Principles cannot override Fundamental Rights. Impact: the 1st Amendment Act (1951) directly nullified this by inserting Article 15(4), expressly permitting reservation for socially/educationally backward classes and SCs/STs.

• Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) — the "Mandal case" — Article 16 — upheld 27% OBC reservation in government jobs under Article 16(4), subject to conditions like creamy-layer exclusion, no reservation in promotions, and a 50% overall ceiling; it struck down a separate 10% economic-reservation order. Impact: this led to the Ram Nandan Committee (to identify the OBC creamy layer), the statutory National Commission for Backward Classes, and five constitutional amendments (76th, 77th, 81st, 82nd and 85th) that variously modified the ruling, especially on reservation in promotions and backlog vacancies.

• M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) — Articles 16 & 335 — upheld the constitutional validity of those four promotion-related amendments (77th, 81st, 82nd, 85th), confirming they must still respect the 50% ceiling, creamy-layer exclusion, and Article 335's administrative-efficiency safeguard — they don't alter Article 16(4)'s basic structure, only extend it to SCs/STs specifically.

The Right to Education — Three Cases, One Amendment

The constitutional right to education took shape across exactly three cases in barely a decade, culminating in one of the Constitution's most significant modern amendments.

The Right to Education — Three Cases, One Amendment

• Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992) — the "Capitation Fee case" — Articles 21 & 41 — declared education a fundamental right flowing from Article 21, at all levels including professional courses like engineering and medicine; struck down capitation fees as arbitrary — "nothing but a price for selling education."

• Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P. (1993) — Articles 21 & 45 — partly upheld and partly overruled Mohini Jain: education remains a fundamental right under Article 21, but free education is guaranteed only until age 14; beyond that, the state's obligation depends on its economic capacity. Private unaided institutions may charge a higher fee than government ones, but capped, and never "commercialised." Impact: this directly led to the 86th Amendment Act (2002), which inserted Article 21-A, and eventually to the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.

• T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) — Articles 29 & 30 — laid down detailed rules for minority educational institutions: "minority" status is determined state-wise (not nationally, given India's linguistic reorganisation of states); professional institutions are covered by Article 30; and once an institution accepts state aid, Article 29(2)'s non-discrimination rule binds it. Impact: to address this judgment (and the related Inamdar case, 2005), the 93rd Amendment Act (2005) inserted Article 15(5), extending reservation to private educational institutions too (barring minority institutions under Article 30(1)).

Governance, Accountability & Criminalisation of Politics

From an oleum gas leak to a cryptocurrency-adjacent RBI circular, this cluster of cases built — case by case — the machinery of institutional accountability that governs Indian public life today.

Governance, Accountability & Criminalisation of Politics

• M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1986) — the "Oleum Gas Leak case" — Articles 21 & 32 — held that Article 32's power is remedial, not merely preventive, letting the Court award compensation for gross Fundamental Rights breaches; it introduced "absolute liability" (with no exceptions at all) in place of the older "strict liability" standard for hazardous industries.

• Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1997) — the "Jain Hawala case" — directed statutory status for the CVC and genuine operational autonomy for the CBI and ED (already covered in this playlist's CVC/CBI article); it struck down the "Single Directive" that required prior government permission before probing officers of Joint-Secretary rank or above. Impact: the CVC Act, 2003 gave the CVC statutory status and superintendence over CBI's corruption investigations — though the Act itself reinstated the Single Directive, which the Court then struck down again, in 2014, as violating Article 14.

• Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) — the "Poll Reforms case" — Article 19 — held voters have an Article 19(1)(a) right to know a candidate's criminal antecedents, assets/liabilities and educational qualifications. Impact: the Election Commission's 2003 order made this affidavit-based disclosure mandatory; furnishing false information in it is now itself an electoral offence.

• PUCL v. Union of India (2013) — the "NOTA case" — Articles 14, 19 & 21 — directed the Election Commission to add a "None of the Above" (NOTA) option to EVMs, protecting a voter's right not to vote while preserving ballot secrecy. First used in the 2013 state elections and the 2014 general election.

• Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013) — Articles 102 & 191 — struck down Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which had let a convicted sitting MP/MLA keep their seat for three months pending appeal; disqualification now takes effect immediately upon conviction.

• T.S.R. Subramanian v. Union of India (2013) directed the creation of Civil Service Boards, fixed minimum tenures for civil servants, and mandated that instructions to officials be given in writing, not verbally — genuine civil-service-reform directives, only partially implemented since. Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006) similarly issued seven police-reform directives — State Security Commissions, a fixed-tenure DGP chosen from a UPSC-empanelled shortlist, separating investigation from law-and-order policing, Police Establishment Boards and Police Complaints Authorities — implemented only partially, with continuing political interference in postings and transfers.

• Rambabu Singh Thakur v. Sunil Arora (2020) required political parties to publish their candidates' full criminal-antecedent details — on party websites, in newspapers, and on social media — along with reasons for selecting them over "clean" candidates, enforced via the Election Commission's Form C-7. And in a much older case, K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1961) upheld a murder conviction but exposed the jury system's flaws so starkly that it directly led to jury trials being abolished altogether by the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Personal Law, Gender Justice & Social Reform

The final cluster spans personal law, gender justice and religious-freedom disputes — several still actively unfolding even today.

Personal Law, Gender Justice & Social Reform

• Shah Bano case (1985) — held a Muslim husband must pay maintenance to a divorced wife beyond the iddat period under the secular Section 125 of the CrPC, which prevails over personal law in case of conflict. Impact: the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 initially overturned this by limiting maintenance to the iddat period, but the Danial Latifi case (2001) upheld that Act while reinterpreting it to still guarantee maintenance beyond iddat.

• Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) — Articles 15 & 21 — laid down the binding "Vishaka Guidelines" against workplace sexual harassment, filling a total legislative vacuum. Impact: the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 finally gave this statutory form.

• NALSA v. Union of India (2014) — Articles 14 & 21 — recognised transgender persons (including hijras) as a "third gender," affirmed their right to self-identified gender, and directed reservation for them as a socially/educationally backward class. Impact: the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019.

• Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) — the "Triple Talaq case" — Article 14 — declared instant "talaq-e-biddat" unconstitutional as manifestly arbitrary, directing Parliament to legislate within six months. Impact: the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 — the "Triple Talaq Act."

• Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018) — Articles 14, 15 & 21 — decriminalised adultery, striking down IPC Section 497 (though it remains valid ground for civil divorce). Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) — Articles 14, 15, 19 & 21 — decriminalised consensual same-sex relations between adults, reading down IPC Section 377 and overruling the earlier Suresh Kumar Koushal case (2013); Section 377 continues to govern non-consensual acts and acts against minors.

• Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) — the "Sabarimala case" — Articles 14, 21 & 25 — struck down the ban on women aged 10-50 entering the Sabarimala temple as unconstitutional. Current status (verified): this triggered mass protests, and the matter was referred in November 2019 to a larger nine-judge Bench examining seven linked religious-freedom questions across faiths (including Muslim women's entry into mosques and Parsi women's access to fire temples after interfaith marriage); that Bench, headed by CJI Surya Kant, reserved its verdict on 14 May 2026 after a 16-day hearing — the final word is still awaited.

• M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2019) — the "Ayodhya case" — awarded the disputed 2.77-acre site to Ram Lalla Virajman, directed 5 alternate acres for the UP Sunni Central Waqf Board at Dhannipur, and overturned the Allahabad High Court's earlier three-way split of the land. Current status (verified): the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Teerth Kshetra trust was formed as directed, and the constructed Ram Mandir's Pran Pratishtha (consecration) ceremony was held on 22 January 2024, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Further Reading

• Standard NCERT-level texts and reference books on the Indian Constitution and Polity (any UPSC reading list).

• The full text of each judgment is available on the Supreme Court of India website and on Indian Kanoon.

Why UPSC Asks This

• The two lineages — basic structure and Article 21 — are tested far more than any individual case in isolation; know the chronological chain, not just isolated facts.

• "Case led to which amendment/Act" is the classic pairing question — Golak Nath→24th Amendment, Champakam Dorairajan→Art 15(4), Unni Krishnan→86th Amendment, Vishaka→2013 Act, Shayara Bano→2019 Act.

• Don't confuse the two "Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association" cases — the 1993 one (Second Judges case) created the collegium; the 2015 one (Fourth Judges/NJAC case) struck down the attempt to replace it.

Test Yourself: Practice Questions & PYQs

Landmark Judgements practice — the basic structure doctrine's evolution, the Article 21 lineage from Gopalan to Puttaswamy, free speech cases, federalism and emergency-power checks, reservation jurisprudence, the right-to-education trilogy, governance/accountability cases, and personal law/gender-justice cases through their currency updates. Then Prelims-pattern PYQs.

Practice Questions

Q1. The Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala judgment, which introduced the basic structure doctrine, was delivered in:

• (a) 1980

• (b) 1971

• (c) 1973

• (d) 1967

Q2. Which constitutional amendment was enacted specifically to override the Golak Nath judgment (1967)?

• (a) The 44th Amendment Act, 1978

• (b) The 42nd Amendment Act, 1976

• (c) The 1st Amendment Act, 1951

• (d) The 24th Amendment Act, 1971

Q3. The Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) judgment is best known for establishing which principle?

• (a) The 'rarest of rare cases' doctrine for the death penalty

• (b) The doctrine of prospective overruling

• (c) The doctrine of absolute liability

• (d) The 'golden triangle' inter-relation of Articles 14, 19 and 21

Q4. In Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980), the Supreme Court invalidated changes made by which amendment?

• (a) The 44th Amendment Act, 1978

• (b) The 24th Amendment Act, 1971

• (c) The 39th Amendment Act, 1975

• (d) The 42nd Amendment Act, 1976

Q5. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that the validity of a proclamation under Article 356 is:

• (a) To be decided solely by the Governor

• (b) To be decided solely by the President without any judicial check

• (c) Entirely beyond judicial review

• (d) Subject to judicial review, with the burden on the Union Government to justify it

Q6. In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992), the Supreme Court upheld OBC reservation in government jobs at what percentage, subject to conditions like creamy-layer exclusion?

• (a) 22.5%

• (b) 15%

• (c) 27%

• (d) 33%

Q7. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court struck down specifically:

• (a) Only the provision on nominated members

• (b) The entire Tenth Schedule

• (c) The 52nd Amendment Act in its entirety

• (d) Only paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule, which had ousted judicial review

Q8. The 'Vishaka Guidelines' against workplace sexual harassment, laid down by the Supreme Court in 1997, were eventually given statutory form by:

• (a) The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013

• (b) The Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017

• (c) The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

• (d) The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013

Q9. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) declared the right to privacy to be:

• (a) A fundamental right intrinsic to Article 21 and Part III

• (b) A Directive Principle under Part IV

• (c) A statutory right under the Information Technology Act

• (d) A right available only to Indian citizens, not foreign nationals

Q10. The Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) judgment:

• (a) Upheld Section 377 as constitutionally valid

• (b) Struck down Section 377 of the IPC in its entirety

• (c) Applied only to non-consensual acts

• (d) Decriminalised only consensual sexual acts between adults of the same sex, reading down Section 377

Q11. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013), the Supreme Court held that a sitting MP or MLA convicted of an offence is disqualified:

• (a) Immediately from the date of conviction

• (b) Only after three months, per Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act

• (c) Only if the Speaker/Chairman decides so

• (d) Only after their appeal in a higher court is finally decided

Q12. The 'None of the Above' (NOTA) option in EVMs was introduced as a direct result of which case?

• (a) Lily Thomas case (2013)

• (b) Association for Democratic Reforms case (2002)

• (c) People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) case (2013)

• (d) Rambabu Singh Thakur case (2020)

UPSC Previous Year Questions (PYQs)

Pattern: chronological ordering within a lineage (basic structure, Article 21); 'case led to which amendment/Act' pairing questions; precise holdings versus common misconceptions (Kihoto Hollohan struck down only paragraph 7, not the whole Tenth Schedule); and current status of matters the book itself left open (Sabarimala reference, Ayodhya temple construction).

Q13. Consider the following statements: (1) The Shankari Prasad case (1951) upheld the validity of the 1st Amendment Act. (2) The Golak Nath case (1967) overruled both the Shankari Prasad case and the Sajjan Singh case. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

• (a) Both 1 and 2

• (b) 2 only

• (c) Neither 1 nor 2

• (d) 1 only

Q14. Consider the following statements regarding the A.D.M. Jabalpur case (1976): (1) It held that a detenu had no locus standi to move a habeas corpus petition once Article 21's enforcement was suspended under Article 359. (2) The 44th Amendment Act, 1978 subsequently ensured that Article 21's enforcement can never again be suspended during an Emergency. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

• (a) 1 only

• (b) 2 only

• (c) Neither 1 nor 2

• (d) Both 1 and 2

Q15. Consider the following statements: (1) The Champakam Dorairajan case (1951) led to the insertion of Article 15(4). (2) The T.M.A. Pai Foundation case (2002), along with the Inamdar case, led to the insertion of Article 15(5). Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

• (a) Neither 1 nor 2

• (b) Both 1 and 2

• (c) 2 only

• (d) 1 only

Q16. Consider the following statements regarding the Ayodhya case (M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2019): (1) The Supreme Court awarded the entire disputed 2.77-acre site to Ram Lalla Virajman. (2) The Pran Pratishtha consecration ceremony of the constructed Ram Mandir was held in January 2024. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

• (a) 2 only

• (b) Neither 1 nor 2

• (c) Both 1 and 2

• (d) 1 only

Q17. Consider the following statements regarding the Sabarimala case: (1) The Indian Young Lawyers Association judgment (2018) struck down the ban on women aged 10-50 entering the Sabarimala temple. (2) As of the present, the nine-judge reference Bench examining this matter has delivered its final verdict. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

• (a) Neither 1 nor 2

• (b) 2 only

• (c) Both 1 and 2

• (d) 1 only

Q18. Consider the following statements regarding the Vineet Narain case (1997) and its aftermath: (1) It struck down the 'Single Directive' requiring prior government permission to investigate senior officers. (2) The Single Directive was never revived after this judgment. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

• (a) Neither 1 nor 2

• (b) 1 only

• (c) Both 1 and 2

• (d) 2 only

Mains Practice Questions

Use these to frame full-length answers. You don't have to answer one exactly — they show the angles UPSC tests, so let them guide which points you cover.

• Trace the evolution of the basic structure doctrine from Shankari Prasad (1951) through Kesavananda Bharati (1973) to Minerva Mills (1980).

• Discuss the evolution of the interpretation of Article 21 from A.K. Gopalan (1950) to Maneka Gandhi (1978) and Puttaswamy (2017).

• Examine the Supreme Court's role in shaping reservation policy through the Champakam Dorairajan, Indra Sawhney and M. Nagaraj cases.

• Discuss the significance of the S.R. Bommai (1994) judgment in curbing the misuse of Article 356.

• 'Judicial pronouncements have often been the trigger for constitutional amendments in India.' Discuss with at least four examples from landmark cases.

• Examine the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence on personal law and gender justice through the Shah Bano, Vishaka, Shayara Bano and Navtej Singh Johar cases.